Android hikey linaro 4.4 #19
Open
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
commit a44323e upstream. The current code goes through a lot of indirection just to call a known handler. Simplify it: just call the handlers directly. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit f840ab1 upstream. The freq_table array is not populated before calling thermal_of_cooling_register. The code which populates the freq table was introduced in commit f685901. This should be done before registering new thermal cooling device. The log shows effects of this wrong decision. [ 2.172614] cpu cpu1: Failed to get voltage for frequency 1984518656000: -34 [ 2.220863] cpu cpu0: Failed to get voltage for frequency 1984524416000: -34 Fixes: f685901 ("thermal: cpu_cooling: Store frequencies in descending order") Signed-off-by: Lukasz Luba <[email protected]> Acked-by: Javi Merino <[email protected]> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 62a584f upstream. As vm.dirty_[background_]bytes can't be applied verbatim to multiple cgroup writeback domains, they get converted to percentages in domain_dirty_limits() and applied the same way as vm.dirty_[background]ratio. However, if the specified bytes is lower than 1% of available memory, the calculated ratios become zero and the writeback domain gets throttled constantly. Fix it by using per-PAGE_SIZE instead of percentage for ratio calculations. Also, the updated DIV_ROUND_UP() usages now should yield 1/4096 (0.0244%) as the minimum ratio as long as the specified bytes are above zero. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Reported-by: Miao Xie <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/[email protected] Fixes: 9fc3a43 ("writeback: separate out domain_dirty_limits()") Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Adjusted comment based on Jan's suggestion. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit d50039e upstream. Also simplify the logic a bit. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit feb9dad upstream. It used to be the case that state had an rwlock that was locked for write by downgrades, but for read for upgrades (opens). Well, the problem is if there are two competing opens for the same state, they step on each other toes potentially leading to leaking file descriptors from the state structure, since access mode is a bitmap only set once. Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 5cc1fb2 upstream. To avoid racing entry into nfs4_get_vfs_file(). Make init_open_stateid() return with locked stateid to be unlocked by the caller. Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 485e71e upstream. Factor out part of posix_acl_xattr_set into a common function that takes a posix_acl, which nfsd can also call. The prototype already exists in include/linux/posix_acl.h. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 9996537 upstream. Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL. Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl. (Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I suspect this may fix other races.) This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by posix_acl_valid. The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit 4ac7249, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly instead of going through xattr handlers. Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]> [[email protected]: use set_posix_acl] Fixes: 4ac7249 Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit d20cb71 upstream. In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code" unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed. It had been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing dcache manipulations), but not for error ones. Only one of those (ENOENT) got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've been done for all errors. As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to call nfs_lookup(). On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in d_splice_alias()). Tested-by: Oleg Drokin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit e547f26 upstream. Olga Kornievskaia reports that the following test fails to trigger an OPEN_DOWNGRADE on the wire, and only triggers the final CLOSE. fd0 = open(foo, RDRW) -- should be open on the wire for "both" fd1 = open(foo, RDONLY) -- should be open on the wire for "read" close(fd0) -- should trigger an open_downgrade read(fd1) close(fd1) The issue is that we're missing a check for whether or not the current state transitioned from an O_RDWR state as opposed to having transitioned from a combination of O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY. Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <[email protected]> Fixes: cd9288f ("NFSv4: Fix another bug in the close/open_downgrade code") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 20c1522 upstream. The value used for Micrel PHY mask is not correct. Use the MICREL_PHY_ID_MASK definition instead. Thanks to Jiri Luznicky for proposing the fix at https://community.freescale.com/thread/387739 Fixes: 709bc06 ("ARM: imx6ul: add fec MAC refrence clock and phy fixup init") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 6245318 upstream. In a subsequent patch, pmd_mknotpresent will clear the valid bit of the pmd entry, resulting in a not-present entry from the hardware's perspective. Unfortunately, pmd_present simply checks for a non-zero pmd value and will therefore continue to return true even after a pmd_mknotpresent operation. Since pmd_mknotpresent is only used for managing huge entries, this is only an issue for the 3-level case. This patch fixes the 3-level pmd_present implementation to take into account the valid bit. For bisectability, the change is made before the fix to pmd_mknotpresent. [[email protected]: comment update regarding pmd_mknotpresent patch] Fixes: 8d96250 ("ARM: mm: Transparent huge page support for LPAE systems.") Cc: Russell King <[email protected]> Cc: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 56530f5 upstream. Currently pmd_mknotpresent will use a zero entry to respresent an invalidated pmd. Unfortunately this definition clashes with pmd_none, thus it is possible for a race condition to occur if zap_pmd_range sees pmd_none whilst __split_huge_pmd_locked is running too with pmdp_invalidate just called. This patch fixes the race condition by modifying pmd_mknotpresent to create non-zero faulting entries (as is done in other architectures), removing the ambiguity with pmd_none. [[email protected]: using L_PMD_SECT_VALID instead of PMD_TYPE_SECT] Fixes: 8d96250 ("ARM: mm: Transparent huge page support for LPAE systems.") Reported-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve Capper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 797179b upstream. Copy __kvm_mips_vcpu_run() into unmapped memory, so that we can never get a TLB refill exception in it when KVM is built as a module. This was observed to happen with the host MIPS kernel running under QEMU, due to a not entirely transparent optimisation in the QEMU TLB handling where TLB entries replaced with TLBWR are copied to a separate part of the TLB array. Code in those pages continue to be executable, but those mappings persist only until the next ASID switch, even if they are marked global. An ASID switch happens in __kvm_mips_vcpu_run() at exception level after switching to the guest exception base. Subsequent TLB mapped kernel instructions just prior to switching to the guest trigger a TLB refill exception, which enters the guest exception handlers without updating EPC. This appears as a guest triggered TLB refill on a host kernel mapped (host KSeg2) address, which is not handled correctly as user (guest) mode accesses to kernel (host) segments always generate address error exceptions. Signed-off-by: James Hogan <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 1118dce upstream. Export these symbols such that UBIFS can implement ->migratepage. Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 4ac1c17 upstream. During page migrations UBIFS might get confused and the following assert triggers: [ 213.480000] UBIFS assert failed in ubifs_set_page_dirty at 1451 (pid 436) [ 213.490000] CPU: 0 PID: 436 Comm: drm-stress-test Not tainted 4.4.4-00176-geaa802524636-dirty #1008 [ 213.490000] Hardware name: Allwinner sun4i/sun5i Families [ 213.490000] [<c0015e70>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 213.490000] [<c0012cdc>] (show_stack) from [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0) [ 213.490000] [<c02ad834>] (dump_stack) from [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty+0x44/0x50) [ 213.490000] [<c0236ee8>] (ubifs_set_page_dirty) from [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one+0x10c/0x3a8) [ 213.490000] [<c00fa0bc>] (try_to_unmap_one) from [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk+0xb4/0x290) [ 213.490000] [<c00fadb4>] (rmap_walk) from [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap+0x64/0x80) [ 213.490000] [<c00fb1bc>] (try_to_unmap) from [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages+0x328/0x7a0) [ 213.490000] [<c010dc28>] (migrate_pages) from [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range+0x168/0x2f4) [ 213.490000] [<c00d0cb0>] (alloc_contig_range) from [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc+0x170/0x2c0) [ 213.490000] [<c010ec00>] (cma_alloc) from [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous+0x38/0xd8) [ 213.490000] [<c001a958>] (__alloc_from_contiguous) from [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc+0x23c/0x274) [ 213.490000] [<c001ad44>] (__dma_alloc) from [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc+0x54/0x5c) [ 213.490000] [<c001ae08>] (arm_dma_alloc) from [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create+0xb8/0xf0) [ 213.490000] [<c035cecc>] (drm_gem_cma_create) from [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle+0x1c/0xe8) [ 213.490000] [<c035cf20>] (drm_gem_cma_create_with_handle) from [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create+0x3c/0x48) [ 213.490000] [<c035d088>] (drm_gem_cma_dumb_create) from [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl+0x12c/0x444) [ 213.490000] [<c0341ed8>] (drm_ioctl) from [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x3f4/0x614) [ 213.490000] [<c0121adc>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 213.490000] [<c0121d30>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000f2c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x34) UBIFS is using PagePrivate() which can have different meanings across filesystems. Therefore the generic page migration code cannot handle this case correctly. We have to implement our own migration function which basically does a plain copy but also duplicates the page private flag. UBIFS is not a block device filesystem and cannot use buffer_migrate_page(). Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> [rw: Massaged changelog, build fixes, etc...] Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 8974189 upstream. As per commit: b7fa30c ("sched/fair: Fix post_init_entity_util_avg() serialization") > the code generated from update_cfs_rq_load_avg(): > > if (atomic_long_read(&cfs_rq->removed_load_avg)) { > s64 r = atomic_long_xchg(&cfs_rq->removed_load_avg, 0); > sa->load_avg = max_t(long, sa->load_avg - r, 0); > sa->load_sum = max_t(s64, sa->load_sum - r * LOAD_AVG_MAX, 0); > removed_load = 1; > } > > turns into: > > ffffffff81087064: 49 8b 85 98 00 00 00 mov 0x98(%r13),%rax > ffffffff8108706b: 48 85 c0 test %rax,%rax > ffffffff8108706e: 74 40 je ffffffff810870b0 <update_blocked_averages+0xc0> > ffffffff81087070: 4c 89 f8 mov %r15,%rax > ffffffff81087073: 49 87 85 98 00 00 00 xchg %rax,0x98(%r13) > ffffffff8108707a: 49 29 45 70 sub %rax,0x70(%r13) > ffffffff8108707e: 4c 89 f9 mov %r15,%rcx > ffffffff81087081: bb 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%ebx > ffffffff81087086: 49 83 7d 70 00 cmpq $0x0,0x70(%r13) > ffffffff8108708b: 49 0f 49 4d 70 cmovns 0x70(%r13),%rcx > > Which you'll note ends up with sa->load_avg -= r in memory at > ffffffff8108707a. So I _should_ have looked at other unserialized users of ->load_avg, but alas. Luckily nikbor reported a similar /0 from task_h_load() which instantly triggered recollection of this here problem. Aside from the intermediate value hitting memory and causing problems, there's another problem: the underflow detection relies on the signed bit. This reduces the effective width of the variables, IOW its effectively the same as having these variables be of signed type. This patch changes to a different means of unsigned underflow detection to not rely on the signed bit. This allows the variables to use the 'full' unsigned range. And it does so with explicit LOAD - STORE to ensure any intermediate value will never be visible in memory, allowing these unserialized loads. Note: GCC generates crap code for this, might warrant a look later. Note2: I say 'full' above, if we end up at U*_MAX we'll still explode; maybe we should do clamping on add too. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Yuyang Du <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 9d89c25 ("sched/fair: Rewrite runnable load and utilization average tracking") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eb70db8 ] People who use PACKET_FANOUT_HASH want a symmetric hash, meaning that they want packets going in both directions on a flow to hash to the same bucket. The core kernel SKB hash became non-symmetric when the ipv6 flow label and other entities were incorporated into the standard flow hash order to increase entropy. But there are no users of PACKET_FANOUT_HASH who want an assymetric hash, they all want a symmetric one. Therefore, use the flow dissector to compute a flat symmetric hash over only the protocol, addresses and ports. This hash does not get installed into and override the normal skb hash, so this change has no effect whatsoever on the rest of the stack. Reported-by: Eric Leblond <[email protected]> Tested-by: Eric Leblond <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82a31b9 ] Similar to commit 9b36881 ("net: fix bridge multicast packet checksum validation") we need to fixup the checksum for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE when pushing skb on RX path. Otherwise we get similar splats. Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Herbert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c086e70 ] Several Lenovo users have reported problems with their Sierra Wireless EM7455 modem. The driver has loaded successfully and the MBIM management channel has appeared to work, including establishing a connection to the mobile network. But no frames have been received over the data interface. The problem affects all EM7455 and MC7455, and is assumed to affect other modems based on the same Qualcomm chipset and baseband firmware. Testing narrowed the problem down to what seems to be a firmware timing bug during initialization. Adding a short sleep while probing is sufficient to make the problem disappear. Experiments have shown that 1-2 ms is too little to have any effect, while 10-20 ms is enough to reliably succeed. Reported-by: Stefan Armbruster <[email protected]> Reported-by: Ralph Plawetzki <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andreas Fett <[email protected]> Reported-by: Rasmus Lerdorf <[email protected]> Reported-by: Samo Ratnik <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: Aleksander Morgado <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 903ce4a ] It was first reported and reproduced by Petr (thanks!) in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=119581 free_percpu(rt->rt6i_pcpu) used to always happen in ip6_dst_destroy(). However, after fixing a deadlock bug in commit 9c7370a ("ipv6: Fix a potential deadlock when creating pcpu rt"), free_percpu() is not called before setting non_pcpu_rt->rt6i_pcpu to NULL. It is worth to note that rt6i_pcpu is protected by table->tb6_lock. kmemleak somehow did not report it. We nailed it down by observing the pcpu entries in /proc/vmallocinfo (first suggested by Hannes, thanks!). Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Fixes: 9c7370a ("ipv6: Fix a potential deadlock when creating pcpu rt") Reported-by: Petr Novopashenniy <[email protected]> Tested-by: Petr Novopashenniy <[email protected]> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]> Cc: Petr Novopashenniy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 4d0cb15 upstream. Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit b31ac42 upstream. Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 3832742 upstream. If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've added a check to fix that. This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link(): (1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the attempt. (2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring has to be the caller's session keyring in practice. (3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring so that it fails with EDQUOT. The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the following: echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by changing the amount of quota used. Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen: kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821! ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25 RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092 RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300 RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202 R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 ... Call Trace: kfree+0xde/0x1bc assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36 __key_link_end+0x55/0x63 key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155 keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0 keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12 SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Fixes: f70e2e0 ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit caf1ff2 upstream. These days, we experienced one guest crash with 8 cores and 3 disks, with qemu error logs as bellow: qemu-system-x86_64: /build/qemu-2.0.0/kvm-all.c:984: kvm_irqchip_commit_routes: Assertion `ret == 0' failed. And then we found one patch(bdf0263) in qemu tree, which said could fix this bug. Execute the following script will reproduce the BUG quickly: irq_affinity.sh ======================================================================== vda_irq_num=25 vdb_irq_num=27 while [ 1 ] do for irq in {1,2,4,8,10,20,40,80} do echo $irq > /proc/irq/$vda_irq_num/smp_affinity echo $irq > /proc/irq/$vdb_irq_num/smp_affinity dd if=/dev/vda of=/dev/zero bs=4K count=100 iflag=direct dd if=/dev/vdb of=/dev/zero bs=4K count=100 iflag=direct done done ======================================================================== The following qemu log is added in the qemu code and is displayed when this bug reproduced: kvm_irqchip_commit_routes: max gsi: 1008, nr_allocated_irq_routes: 1024, irq_routes->nr: 1024, gsi_count: 1024. That's to say when irq_routes->nr == 1024, there are 1024 routing entries, but in the kernel code when routes->nr >= 1024, will just return -EINVAL; The nr is the number of the routing entries which is in of [1 ~ KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES], not the index in [0 ~ KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES - 1]. This patch fix the BUG above. Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wei Tang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhuoyu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit ff30ef4 upstream. I couldn't get Xen to boot a L2 HVM when it was nested under KVM - it was getting a GP(0) on a rather unspecial vmread from Xen: (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.7.0-rc x86_64 debug=n Not tainted ]---- (XEN) CPU: 1 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450 (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010202 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) (XEN) rax: ffff82d0801e6288 rbx: ffff83003ffbfb7c rcx: fffffffffffab928 (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000000 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: ffff83000bdd0000 (XEN) rbp: ffff83000bdd0000 rsp: ffff83003ffbfab0 r8: ffff830038813910 (XEN) r9: ffff83003faf3958 r10: 0000000a3b9f7640 r11: ffff83003f82d418 (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: ffff83003ffbffff r14: 0000000000004802 (XEN) r15: 0000000000000008 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000001526e0 (XEN) cr3: 000000003fc79000 cr2: 0000000000000000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d0801e629e> (vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450): (XEN) 00 00 41 be 02 48 00 00 <44> 0f 78 74 24 08 0f 86 38 56 00 00 b8 08 68 00 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83003ffbfab0: ... (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801f3695>] get_page_from_gfn_p2m+0x165/0x300 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bfe32>] hvmemul_get_seg_reg+0x52/0x60 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bfe93>] hvm_emulate_prepare+0x53/0x70 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801ccacb>] handle_mmio+0x2b/0xd0 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801be591>] emulate.c#_hvm_emulate_one+0x111/0x2c0 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cd6a4>] handle_hvm_io_completion+0x274/0x2a0 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801f334a>] __get_gfn_type_access+0xfa/0x270 (XEN) [<ffff82d08012f3bb>] timer.c#add_entry+0x4b/0xb0 (XEN) [<ffff82d08012f80c>] timer.c#remove_entry+0x7c/0x90 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c8433>] hvm_do_resume+0x23/0x140 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e4fe7>] vmx_do_resume+0xa7/0x140 (XEN) [<ffff82d080164aeb>] context_switch+0x13b/0xe40 (XEN) [<ffff82d080128e6e>] schedule.c#schedule+0x22e/0x570 (XEN) [<ffff82d08012c0cc>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x5c/0x90 (XEN) [<ffff82d0801602c5>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x25/0x50 (XEN) (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 1: (XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT (XEN) [error_code=0000] (XEN) **************************************** Tracing my host KVM showed it was the one injecting the GP(0) when emulating the VMREAD and checking the destination segment permissions in get_vmx_mem_address(): 3) | vmx_handle_exit() { 3) | handle_vmread() { 3) | nested_vmx_check_permission() { 3) | vmx_get_segment() { 3) 0.074 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_base(); 3) 0.065 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(); 3) 0.066 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(); 3) 1.636 us | } 3) 0.058 us | vmx_get_rflags(); 3) 0.062 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(); 3) 3.469 us | } 3) | vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits() { 3) 0.058 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(); 3) 0.662 us | } 3) | get_vmx_mem_address() { 3) 0.068 us | vmx_cache_reg(); 3) | vmx_get_segment() { 3) 0.074 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_base(); 3) 0.068 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(); 3) 0.071 us | vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(); 3) 1.756 us | } 3) | kvm_queue_exception_e() { 3) 0.066 us | kvm_multiple_exception(); 3) 0.684 us | } 3) 4.085 us | } 3) 9.833 us | } 3) + 10.366 us | } Cross-checking the KVM/VMX VMREAD emulation code with the Intel Software Developper Manual Volume 3C - "VMREAD - Read Field from Virtual-Machine Control Structure", I found that we're enforcing that the destination operand is NOT located in a read-only data segment or any code segment when the L1 is in long mode - BUT that check should only happen when it is in protected mode. Shuffling the code a bit to make our emulation follow the specification allows me to boot a Xen dom0 in a nested KVM and start HVM L2 guests without problems. Fixes: f9eb4af ("KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: add checks for #GP/#SS exceptions") Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <[email protected]> Cc: Eugene Korenevsky <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit ed596a4 upstream. Flushing a work that reschedules itself is not a sensible operation. It needs to be killed. Failure to do so leads to a kernel panic in the timer code. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…mands commit 93a2001 upstream. This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter leading to a heap overflow. Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 6dd2e27 upstream. The usage Confidence is mandary to Windows Precision Touchpad devices. If it is examined in input_mapping on a WIndows Precision Touchpad, a new add quirk MT_QUIRK_CONFIDENCE desgned for such devices will be applied to the device. A touch with the confidence bit is not set is determined as invalid. Tested on Dell XPS13 9343 Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> # XPS 13 9350, BIOS 1.4.3 Signed-off-by: Allen Hung <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 70c8217 upstream. If a task uses a non constant string for the format parameter in trace_printk(), then the trace_printk_fmt variable is set to NULL. This variable is then saved in the __trace_printk_fmt section. The function hold_module_trace_bprintk_format() checks to see if duplicate formats are used by modules, and reuses them if so (saves them to the list if it is new). But this function calls lookup_format() that does a strcmp() to the value (which is now NULL) and can cause a kernel oops. This wasn't an issue till 3debb0a ("tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print when not using bprintk()") which added "__used" to the trace_printk_fmt variable, and before that, the kernel simply optimized it out (no NULL value was saved). The fix is simply to handle the NULL pointer in lookup_format() and have the caller ignore the value if it was NULL. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: xingzhen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Fixes: 3debb0a ("tracing: Fix trace_printk() to print when not using bprintk()") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
…y-linaro-4.4-aosp
Adds helpers to do SMC and HVC based on ARM SMC Calling Convention. CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC is enabled for architectures that may support the SMC or HVC instruction. It's the responsibility of the caller to know if the SMC instruction is supported by the platform. This patch doesn't provide an implementation of the declared functions. Later patches will bring in implementations and set CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC for ARM and ARM64 respectively. Change-Id: If9182cf66926f668c56ab7b5db3d5199da67395f Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Adds implementation for arm-smccc and enables CONFIG_HAVE_SMCCC for architectures that may support arm-smccc. It's the responsibility of the caller to know if the SMC instruction is supported by the platform. Change-Id: I3656cac5469dc0c8d96117ba33c53b37d92dbfab Reviewed-by: Lars Persson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Brown <[email protected]>
Adds implementation for arm-smccc and enables CONFIG_HAVE_SMCCC. Change-Id: I0751001628f0c46e5eb0f0f9c253718491875591 Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Brown <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Introduces linaro prefix and adds bindings for ARM TrustZone based OP-TEE implementation. Change-Id: I777c012b744c2ebdfd0b09aba08170c587d26e0a Acked-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Initial patch for generic TEE subsystem. This subsystem provides: * Registration/un-registration of TEE drivers. * Shared memory between normal world and secure world. * Ioctl interface for interaction with user space. * Sysfs implementation_id of TEE driver A TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) driver is a driver that interfaces with a trusted OS running in some secure environment, for example, TrustZone on ARM cpus, or a separate secure co-processor etc. The TEE subsystem can serve a TEE driver for a Global Platform compliant TEE, but it's not limited to only Global Platform TEEs. This patch builds on other similar implementations trying to solve the same problem: * "optee_linuxdriver" by among others Jean-michel DELORME<[email protected]> and Emmanuel MICHEL <[email protected]> * "Generic TrustZone Driver" by Javier González <[email protected]> Change-Id: I9b859011fe6eb697fb6771724d6933df9fdfb895 Acked-by: Andreas Dannenberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Adds a OP-TEE driver which also can be compiled as a loadable module. * Targets ARM and ARM64 * Supports using reserved memory from OP-TEE as shared memory * Probes OP-TEE version using SMCs * Accepts requests on privileged and unprivileged device * Uses OPTEE message protocol version 2 to communicate with secure world Change-Id: I2fa86374de723602a9edd642c1a4f26c5455d79b Acked-by: Andreas Dannenberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I890b6d1c25525d149ca10cd63aba6f3954acb72f Acked-by: Andreas Dannenberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Adds a kernel internal TEE client interface to be used by other drivers. Change-Id: I3bd6ad0037a319ac489749f378f1714b1d017ebd Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Enables use of PSCI for foundation-v8. Change-Id: I119ea8fbf5f37527f07d0b1c20f575049ce48977 Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Uses GICv2 for foundation-v8. Change-Id: I0200801e264bee5a285a1d3490ec5699bb489c5b Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Configures foundation-v8 with OP-TEE. Change-Id: I08f6cef05cbe38b11e93a0d62ec1b32e8d74ab53 Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Adds qemu-v8 with OP-TEE and PSCI. Change-Id: I56820911f2115f60cd2fe2309e25d94af314c9b4 Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I0a63c65b84cc0f159b505118db9e75288baa1190 Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pascal Brand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Configures Juno with OP-TEE. Change-Id: Id38c8b2e2e25ca662c4b7df19f6a511ac5797100 Reviewed-by: Pascal Brand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Prevents two OP-TEE supplicant processes from running simultaneously. Change-Id: I7398c52f25b9b6828cc573356cae73430b732bf2 Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pascal Brand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Corrections based on output from tool provided by Nishanth Menon at https://github.com/nmenon/kernel_patch_verify The patch will merged into the "tee: add OP-TEE driver" commit when creating the v10 patch set. Change-Id: I29d3606e3eda784e1d70988c5ebb9483e2ae37ca Reviewed-by: Pascal Brand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Corrections based on output from tool provided by Nishanth Menon at https://github.com/nmenon/kernel_patch_verify The patch will merged into the "tee: generic TEE subsystem" commit when creating the v10 patch set. Change-Id: I858549d6e658e022d14d61dd3d1d1cf7228fd189 Reviewed-by: Pascal Brand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Prior to this patch the ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL constant was of an unsigned type causing unwanted sign extension. This patch explicitly selects an unsigned type for the constant. Change-Id: I2f00aac76a7b2201f4a439d40e14d352f0052fb3 Reviewed-by: Pascal Brand <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> (QEMU Aarch64) Reported-by: Saksham Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Adds a juno-r2.dts based on juno-r1.dts configured with OP-TEE. Change-Id: I4037ce8d08ef2985e3cf5c3c2fc81bc29c7da15d Signed-off-by: Miraje Gentilal <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Avoids delayed release of a shared memory object allocated by supplicant. Change-Id: I7ff3114f86b19932bc13bebe7c17a8e54ea1f474 Tested-by: Jerome Forissier <[email protected]> (HiKey) Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> (QEMU) Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I3b43b1db5053654d348e4d897a907236680ead9f Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kuscsik <[email protected]>
|
Since this is a rebase I'm not reviewing each and every patch. Since you say all tests on xtest passes, then I'm happy with this as it is.
|
|
@jbech-linaro Can we close this? I will create a separate pull request with the latest code. |
|
Absolutely if that is the easiest for you. An alternative, would be that you simply just force push to the same branch (if it's still 4.4 that is the candidate). I.e. |
vchong
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 24, 2017
commit 4dfce57 upstream. There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes, when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents on the temporary inode, something like: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr" [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10] #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs] #10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs] #11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs] #12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs] #13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs] #14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67 #15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5 #16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8 #17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c #18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b #19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e #20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27 #21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c #22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes instead. This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun. Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number of extents, not di_nextents. Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the root cause. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
vchong
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Feb 24, 2017
commit faab509 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reports that fuzz testing with syzkaller causes a KASAN warning in gadgetfs: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_config+0x86f/0x1190 at addr ffff88003c47e160 Write of size 65537 by task syz-executor0/6356 CPU: 3 PID: 6356 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc7+ #19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 ffff88003c107ad8 ffffffff81f96aba ffffffff3dc11ef0 1ffff10007820eee ffffed0007820ee6 ffff88003dc11f00 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff8598b4c8 ffffffff81f96828 ffffffff813fb4a0 ffff88003b6eadc0 ffff88003c107738 Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffff81f96aba>] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff817e4dec>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:159 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:197 [<ffffffff817e5080>] kasan_report_error+0x1f0/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:286 [<ffffffff817e5705>] kasan_report+0x35/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:306 [< inline >] check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:308 [<ffffffff817e3fb9>] check_memory_region+0x139/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:315 [<ffffffff817e4044>] kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:326 [< inline >] copy_from_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:689 [< inline >] ep0_write drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1135 [<ffffffff83228caf>] dev_config+0x86f/0x1190 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1759 [<ffffffff817fdd55>] __vfs_write+0x5d5/0x760 fs/read_write.c:510 [<ffffffff817ff650>] vfs_write+0x170/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560 [< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607 [<ffffffff81803a5b>] SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599 [<ffffffff84f47ec1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Indeed, there is a comment saying that the value of len is restricted to a 16-bit integer, but the code doesn't actually do this. This patch fixes the warning. It replaces the comment with a computation that forces the amount of data copied from the user in ep0_write() to be no larger than the wLength size for the control transfer, which is a 16-bit quantity. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
vchong
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 4, 2018
commit 6f6060a upstream. APM_DO_POP_SEGS does not restore fs/gs which were zeroed by APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS. Trying to access __preempt_count with zeroed fs doesn't really work. Move the ibrs call outside the APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS/APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS invocations so that fs is actually restored before calling preempt_enable(). Fixes the following sort of oopses: [ 0.313581] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 0.313803] Modules linked in: [ 0.314040] CPU: 0 PID: 268 Comm: kapmd Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-triton-bisect-00090-gdd84441a7971 #19 [ 0.316161] EIP: __apm_bios_call_simple+0xc8/0x170 [ 0.316161] EFLAGS: 00210016 CPU: 0 [ 0.316161] EAX: 00000102 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000102 EDX: 00000000 [ 0.316161] ESI: 0000530e EDI: dea95f64 EBP: dea95f18 ESP: dea95ef0 [ 0.316161] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 [ 0.316161] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 015d3000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 0.316161] Call Trace: [ 0.316161] ? cpumask_weight.constprop.15+0x20/0x20 [ 0.316161] on_cpu0+0x44/0x70 [ 0.316161] apm+0x54e/0x720 [ 0.316161] ? __switch_to_asm+0x26/0x40 [ 0.316161] ? __schedule+0x17d/0x590 [ 0.316161] kthread+0xc0/0xf0 [ 0.316161] ? proc_apm_show+0x150/0x150 [ 0.316161] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x20/0x20 [ 0.316161] ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38 [ 0.316161] Code: da 8e c2 8e e2 8e ea 57 55 2e ff 1d e0 bb 5d b1 0f 92 c3 5d 5f 07 1f 89 47 0c 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 90 <64> ff 0d 84 16 5c b1 74 7f 8b 45 dc 8e e0 8b 45 d8 8e e8 8b 45 [ 0.316161] EIP: __apm_bios_call_simple+0xc8/0x170 SS:ESP: 0068:dea95ef0 [ 0.316161] ---[ end trace 656253db2deaa12c ]--- Fixes: dd84441 ("x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware") Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
vchong
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 5, 2018
commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
odeprez
pushed a commit
to odeprez/linux-swg
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 9, 2023
The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f linaro-swg#1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 linaro-swg#2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee linaro-swg#3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 linaro-swg#4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 linaro-swg#5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c linaro-swg#6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] linaro-swg#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] linaro-swg#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f linaro-swg#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 linaro-swg#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] linaro-swg#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc linaro-swg#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] linaro-swg#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] linaro-swg#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] linaro-swg#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] linaro-swg#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 linaro-swg#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] linaro-swg#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] linaro-swg#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 linaro-swg#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Rebase to the latest AOSP master. Tested on hikey with fresh fip.bin. All xtest test cases passed.