diff --git a/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md b/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md
index 50693960..bf16059d 100644
--- a/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md
+++ b/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Yet the hostilities have been far from one-sided. Democracies have, by and larg
This failure has manifested in four ways. First, public opinion in democratic countries and their policy-makers are increasingly hostile to large technology companies and even many technologists, a trend commonly called the “techlash”. Second, democratic countries have significantly reduced their direct investment in the development of information technology. Third, democratic countries have been slow to adopt technology in public sector applications or that require significant public sector participation. Finally, and relatedly, democratic governments have largely failed to address the areas where most technologists believe public participation, regulation, and support are critical to technology advancing in a sustainable way, focusing instead on more familiar social and political problems[^DemocracyTechHostility].
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Beginning with recent trends in the increasingly well-measured venture capital i
However, while these priorities are relatively recent and appear to emerge from the logic of “the market”, they reflect a much longer-running and collectively direct set of choices. These stem from the investments governments in democratic countries have made. [^GartnerReport].