5.1. Example Voting Math
5.2. Scenario 1
For vote options A,B,C,D, null and public keys labelled 1,2,3 ... consider the following data matrix:
| ID | Status | PIVS | Filter | S% | I vote | I% | N2 | N2% | Rank Vector | % total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Output | /1000 | Vote | Top First | |||||||
| 1 | none | 550 | 500 | 0 | 30 | 2.14 | 42 | 3.5 | ABDNC | 5.64 |
| 2 | none | 5000 | 4000 | 0 | 954 | 6.83 | 145 | 12.1 | ACBND | 18.93 |
| 3 | staker | 20k | 14k | 41.17 | 7631 | 54.61 | 307 | 25.6 | BADNC | 121.38 |
| 4 | none | 3000 | 2000 | 0 | 302 | 2.16 | 96 | 8 | BCNDA | 10.16 |
| 5 | staker | 3000 | 3000 | 8.83 | 592 | 4.24 | 122 | 10.2 | ADBNC | 23.27 |
| 6 | none | 2000 | 1000 | 0 | 95 | 0.68 | 63 | 5.3 | DNACB | 5.98 |
| 7 | m-node | 10k | 8000 | 50 | 4069 | 29.32 | 163 | 13.6 | ABDNC | 92.92 |
| 8 | none | 1000 | 900 | 0 | 80 | 0.58 | 59 | 4.92 | BADCN | 5.5 |
| 9 | none | 800 | 700 | 0 | 53 | 0.379 | 51 | 4.25 | CABDN | 4.629 |
| 10 | none | 600 | 500 | 0 | 30 | 0.215 | 42 | 3.5 | ABCND | 3.715 |
| 11 | none | 700 | 600 | 0 | 41 | 0.293 | 46 | 3.83 | ACBDN | 4.123 |
| 12 | none | 1200 | 1000 | 0 | 95 | 0.680 | 63 | 5.3 | ABDNC | 5.98 |
| total | 36400 | 100 | 13972 | 100 | 1199 | 100 |
The intended effect of power voting is clearly functioning, as visible in the differing vote percentages between I and N2.
Notice that some of the system criteria don't make sense with this small of a sample size, so we will omit the 4% single account cap on the I layer. In a real vote, single account vote percentages would of course be much smaller. Also, recall that the m-node gets extra I vote and diminished N2 vote while checking. The vote weights are calculated from the filter output. For the S layer, the vote weights are the filter output for stakers and masternodes. Note that the filter output can not be higher than the PIV holding.
Interpretation: Option C is eliminated by the S layer because it gets 50% negative (below N) from the only masternode and both stakers also placed it below N, therefore giving it another 50% negative for that layer. No other options are blocked, so the remaining options continue to the macro-vote.
Inspection reveals that N will be the obvious first loser. Therefore we can reduce our further considerations to the options A,B, and D. To simplify the calculation of the weighted copeland scores, we will combine percentages into a single percentage (% total) so that the equation looks like (W-L) * %total where W is compare wins and L is compare losses.
The weighted copeland scores clearly reveal b as the next loser, leaving only A and B in the struggle for the second weighted copeland score. A eeks out as the winner with 28.147 positive.
| ID | A (WCS) | B (WCS) | D (WCS) | A (WCS2) | B (WCS2) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 11.28 | 0 | -11.28 | 5.64 | -5.64 |
| 2 | 37.86 | 0 | -37.86 | 18.93 | -18.93 |
| 3 | 0 | 242.76 | -242.76 | -121.38 | 121.38 |
| 4 | -20.32 | 20.32 | 0 | -10.16 | 10.16 |
| 5 | 46.54 | -46.54 | 0 | 23.27 | -23.27 |
| 6 | 0 | -11.96 | 11.96 | 5.98 | -5.98 |
| 7 | 185.84 | 0 | -185.84 | 92.92 | -92.92 |
| 8 | 0 | 11 | -11 | -5.5 | 5.5 |
| 9 | 9.258 | 0 | -9.258 | 4.629 | -4.629 |
| 10 | 7.43 | 0 | -7.43 | 3.715 | -3.715 |
| 11 | 8.246 | 0 | -8.246 | 4.123 | -4.123 |
| 12 | 11.96 | 0 | -11.96 | 5.98 | -5.98 |
| total | 298.094 | 215.58 | -513.67 | 28.147 | -28.147 |
There are quite a few roles the people who involve themselves with PIVX may play. Whether it is one or many, these roles will determine their interests and how they’ll vote. A few of the important ones are listed below:
Whales
Fat cats who move large volume, sometimes making visible splashes in the markets.
Some are just wealthy people, but
others come from financial institutions who trade with other peoples money.
Traders
From the exchanges, mostly. They like predictable volatility, often use
backtested tradebots, may be leveraging borrowed currency (margin), and
mercurially may be either bullish or bearish, depending on if they plan to
buy or sell, respectively.
Investors
Separate from the traders, because they buy and hold long term. Since they are
healthy to the system, PIVX incentives
them with staking and masternode rewards, which lands them in the S layer.
Developers
The ones who design improvements. You, presumably, in the I layer.
Suppliers/Customers
Using cryptos to trade either goods or services,
these people will mostly need low transaction fees, stable currency
values, and quality representation in the N<sup>2</sup> layer.
Whale traders often proactively push currency value towards the direction they think it’s already headed. If they are bulls, they may publically declare it diamonds, and will vote accordingly. If they are bearish, however, whale traders will be most likely trying to push the price down.
Suppose some whales from JP Morgan and other financial institutions decide PIVX has potential, although it hasn't been doing all that well lately. First, they act as bears, spreading 'FUD' and doubt, possibly even borrowing PIVX on margin, and selling them. However, as the price dips a bit further, they then buy up a few million $ worth of undervalued PIVX. Some of the bots and traders, seeing how the market has suddenly picked up momentum, following common indicators and technical analysis, also buy in, which drives the price up further.
Now the price is up, but if the whales tried to sell right then, so would the other traders, and besides, they bought PIVX because they thought it had potential. Even if they did sell soon. With pivmetheus, they still wouldn't get a vote because of the EMA, so voting actions would be delayed. Without such delays and multiple voting layers requiring conquest, they will quickly have power to install what rules they wish.
Suppose after some time, the devs come up with a great new feature and it boosts PIVX value yet further. Now they wait, and play the role of investors, slowly buying more pivs, as if they were blowing upwards on a feather, until they decide they would finally like to sell. Now that they have a strong vote, they wait for a major issue to arise and create a rather unpopular option for the issue, or simply think up something lousy to vote in.
Now, if we have single layer or 1p1v voting, the whales can erect a large number of masternodes or stakers or simply hold a large amount of PIVX, whatever strategy obtains the most vote. They can promote and vote in a lousy option and instantly dump their pivs at high price, even margin-sell them. Just after they sell, they send people to forums and/or on the news etc. and boo-hoo about the lousy option just passed, and about the falling price. Now the momentum has switched. They take small amounts of remaining PIVX and gently blow the feather back down, since it's trying to fall and the public is panic selling. They then pick up their PIVS again at panic-sell bottom price, and when they recover their voting power, they can correct the lousy option and promote the price back up.
If PIVmetheus is installed, the required PIVX holdings for this strategy would be excessive. If they get enough PIVs to dominate the I layer, they could shoot for that domination. Unfortunately for them, it's extremely difficult to dominate both the I and N2 layers. If they cut their accounts to grab N2 vote, the remaining I players will block their lousy option. If they don't, the N2 layer will block their lousy option. If they invest enough to dominate both layers, they push the price up fantastically, and take extreme risk of others selling at very high price out from underneath them, and leaving themselves proud owners of their own personal currency of severely diminished value. They can do nothing with it but sell lower than they purchased. There is no, or practically no profitable way to install a lousy option, dump, insult, and re-purchase because PIVmetheus doesn't accept lousy options. Furthermore, the time required to make an attack on PIVmetheus would be excessive. Far better to attack a currency that gives them immediate control.